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ABSTRACT

The structure and organization of industries evolves over time in response to changes in the price
and availability of inputs, changes in the demand for outputs and output attributes, and changes in
technology. The growing demand for traceability and assurance is a change in the demand for credence
attributes. Firms that are able to organize to provide traceability and assurance at low cost will, ceteris
paribus, have an advantage. In recent years, many segments of the food and agribusiness industry have
become more concentrated through horizontal or vertical integration within firms or within associations
of firms (cooperatives). This paper explores changes to the relative competitiveness of vertically
integrated firms and horizontally and vertically aligned cooperative associations in response to demand
for traceability and assurance with respect to food safety, product quality, and credence attributes. The
Chilean salmon aquaculture industry is used as a contextual example.
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INTRODUCTION

Increased demand for traceability and assurance will affect the relative competitiveness of firms
in markets such as the U.S., Japan, and E.U., which are evermore conscious of food safety,
quality, and credence attributes related to labor, capital, and resource inputs to production, and
the impact of production processes on the physical, biological, and human environment. Given
the nature of tracing products or product attributes through the food chain, transaction costs will
differ depending on industry and company structures and the nature of the information being
transmitted. Thus, the effect of traceability on the relative competitiveness of firms will depend on
their ability to efficiently organize and transfer information through the supply chain. Large
vertically integrated firms that transfer information internally mayor may not have a cost
advantage over smaller non-integrated firms that bundle information and goods in market
transactions.
As recently as 1995, the salmon aquaculture industry was, to a large degree, composed of many

small independent firms: small farms, small feed suppliers, and small processors (Anderson
1995). Since then, salmon aquaculture has increasingly become the domain of horizontally and
I Cite as: Olson, Tyler K., and Keith R. Criddle. 2005. Industrial Evolution in Response to Changes in the Demand for
Traceability and Assurance: a Case Study of Chilean Salmon Aquaculture, p. xx-xx. In: Sumaila, Rashid Ced.) Proceedings
of the 2005 NAAFE Forum. Fisheries Centre Research Reports VCn). Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia,
Vancouver, Canada.
2 Support for this project was provided, in part, by the Utah Agricultural Experiment Station.
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vertically integrated multinational firms (Tvetedls 2004). Consolidation has been driven by
increasing returns to scale in feed production, hatchery operations, grow-out facilities,
processing, and distribution. In addition, total output has increased both in response to costsavings associated with efficiencies of scale, cost savings associated with technology advances
(Asche 1997), and cost savings associated with efficiencies of scope. In Chile, increased scope has
come about through ownership, cooperation, and contracts. Positive agglomeration externalities
often arise in regions where production is localized in the form of a cluster of interdependent
firms (Tvetedis 2002). For the past decade, the Chilean salmon industry has actively encouraged
the development of just such a cluster.

Chilean Salmon Aquaculture Industry
It is only in the last decade that Chile has emerged as a major supplier of farmed salmon and trout
(Bj0rndal and Aarland 1999). The Chilean salmon industry is concentrated in southern Chile,

with hatchery operations in and around Lake Uanquihue, feed production in and around the
cities of Osorno and Puerto Montt, grow-out operations around Chiloe Island, and processing
facilities around the city of Puerto Montt and on Chiloe Island. Recently, grow-out and processing
operations have extended increasingly into regions that are more southerly. The long coastal
strip-approximately 1,700 kilometers-running from Region X through Region XII provides
several natural advantages for hatcheries and salmon farms: abundant clean freshwater, cool
clean seawater, low salinity, moderate currents, and fjords and inlets that shelter net-pens and
associated farm structures from storm surges. Production by region for 2003 was 83% for Region
X, 16% in Region XI, and 1% in Region XII (Sernapesca 2005).
The four salmonids farmed in Chile are Atlantic salmon, coho salmon, chinook salmon, and
rainbow trout. Production of Atlantic salmon represents over 57% of harvest, nearly 50% of
export volume, and near 60% of export value (Table 1).
Table

1.

Harvest by Species (metric tons)
Atlantic salmon

1993
29,182
1994
34,175
1995
54,250
1996
77,327
1997
96,675
1998
107,066
103,242
1999
2000
166,897
2001
253,850
2002
248,407
280,301
2003
Source: Sernapesca (2005).

Coho salmon

Chinook salmon

25,177
34,538
44,037
66,988
73,408
76,954
76,324
93,419
136,870
94,927
91,797

859
379
371
341
738
108
208
2,524
3,807
2,248
1,526

Rainbow trout

Total

22,257
32,866
42,719
54,429
77,110
75,108
50,414
79,566
109,895
105,410
114,607

77,475
101,958
141,377
199,085
247,931
259,236
230,188
342,406
504,422
450,992
488,231

Although initially comprised of small independent firms with heavy reliance on foreign
technology and production inputs, the Chilean salmon aquaculture industry has evolved into a
complex cluster of interdependent suppliers, producers, processors, distributors, and supporting
entities. Clusters are regional concentrations of companies and institutions that compete but also
cooperate (Porter 1990, 1998). The Chilean salmon cluster presents multiple levels of competition
and cooperation. The cluster consists of a mix of small, medium, and large firms; some integrated
vertically, horizontally, or in cooperatives; all interacting under the auspices of one encompassing
association, SalmonChile.
Over half of all firms who participate in the nucleus of the value chain, from hatchery to
processing, are forward or backward integrated. Feed inputs are the only source of supply that is
integrated mainly within the largest salmon producers. Consolidation in feed production has
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resulted in a decline from 23 factories in 1992 to seven in 2003. Of those seven, two-Salmones
Antartica S.A. and Cultivos Marinos Chiloe Ltda-are wholly vertically integrated with
coordinated management (SalmonChile 2004). While Skretting Chile S.A., Ewos Chile S.A., and
Salmofood S.A share ownership interests with particular farm operators, they, along with Biomar
Chile and Alitec, also produce and sell feed to independent farm operators.
Over the past few years, consolidation has left 39.5% of export value concentrated among the top
three producers and 70.3% of export value concentrated among the top nine producers (Table 2).
These trends indicate increasing returns to scale; being big seems to offer advantages with respect
to production, logistics, and marketing in the global salmon market.
Table

2.

Main Producers in the Chilean Salmon Industry
Company

Export Value

Structure and Ownership

(2004)

$ million

%

216

15%

190

13.2%

164

11.3%

100
95

6.9%
6.6%

Cultivos Marinos Chiloe S.A.

75

5.2%

Pesquera Los Fiordos Ltda.

66

4.6%

Salmones Antartica S.A.

64

4.4%

Pesca Chile S.A.

44

3.1%

Other Exporters

427

29.7%

Marine Harvest Chile S.A. /
Stolt Sea Farm Chile
AquaChile / Aguas C1aras S.A.
Salmones Mainstream S.A. /
Fjord Seafood Chile S.A.
Pesquera Camanchaca S.A.
Salmones Multiexport Ltda.

Vertically integrated, Dutch owned (Nutreco)
Vertically integrated, Chilean owned
Vertically integrated, Norwegian owned (Cermaq
and Fjord Seafood, merger pending)
Vertically integrated, Chilean owned
Vertically integrated, Chilean owned
Vertically integrated with coordinated
management, Chilean owned
Vertically integrated, Chilean owned (Agrosuper)
Vertically integrated with coordinated
management, Japanese owned (Nippon Suisan)
Vertically integrated, Spanish owned
(Pescanova)

Sources: RevistaAgua (2005); Montero (2004); Agua al Dia (2005).

Information Transfer through the Production Chain
The amount, accuracy, and verifiability of information recorded are choices for producers trying
to satisfy demands of food safety and traceability; more information allows for more detailed
traceability, but can be costly to maintain and could be an asset or liability in the event of legal
action against the firm. Information costs increase when it becomes necessary to maintain a
verifiable trail of information about the genetic characteristic of broodstock or the use of organic
feeds. These types of attributes are difficult to detect through sampling the fish and must instead
be verified by auditable records that document that batches with differing attributes are not comingled or provided inappropriate feeds or pharmaceuticals at anytime from egg-production
through grow-out.
The credibility of a traceability system could depend on whether assurance is provided by the
firm, by a government agency, or by an independent for-profit firm or nonprofit association.
Compromising the integrity of a traceability system for credence attributes could be as simple as
the inadvertent mixing of fish from different cages, inaccuracies in information transferred from
the hatchery, or mislabeling of feeds or human error in the application of feeds and
pharmaceuticals. Implementing traceability systems means solving a variety of complex problems
that differ depending on company structure (vertically integrated, etc.), market requirements, and
resources available. Any credible traceability system must address the transfer of information
through the three stages of production (hatchery/nursery, grow-out, and processing) and the
transfer of information regarding feed and other inputs used in each of the production stages. In
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the next sections, we will discuss the three stages of fish production and feed production to
illustrate the type of information that would need to be transferred and potential vulnerabilities
that could compromise the integrity of a traceability system.
Hatchery/Nursery Operations
The first stage of production-spawning, egg fertilization, incubation, and development and
growth from egg to smolt is carried out in hatchery facilities located in or adjacent to a source of
high-quality fresh water. Two production systems and three modes of operation are currently
used for hatchery/nursery operations in Chile. The two production systems are lake-based tank
and pen systems, and stream-based tank systems. The three operation modes are smolt
production from hatchery-provided eggs for farms owned by the same company; smolt
production from hatchery-provided eggs for farms owned by unrelated companies; and, smolt
production for farms owned by unrelated companies, using eggs provided by those farms.
Piscicultura Ri6 de la Plata, located near Tegualda, about 30 miles northwest of Puerto Montt,
Chile is a typical of stream-based tank system hatchery. The hatchery is designed for batch
production in independent tanks. Because each tank is independent, it is relatively simple to
isolate disease and to produce multiple verifiably distinct genetic strains or feed regimes.
Piscicultura Ri6 de la Plata produces about 600 million smolts per year. Of these, 93% are
produced for farms owned by its parent, the Camanchaca Fishing Company. The remaining
smolts are produced for sale to farms owned by other companies. While most of the smolts sold to
other farms are grown from eggs produced by the Camanchaca Fishing Company, some smolts
are produced using eggs provided from broodstock maintained by contracting farms. In
November 2004, about 10% of the smolts in production at Piscicultura Ri6 de la Plata were being
maintained on certified organic feeds. In March 2005, Camanchaca Inc. introduced "Pier 33
Organic Salmon," certified by Naturland, a leading organic certifier (The Wave 200sa).
Phase I begins with broodstock whose eggs and roe are stripped and mixed together for
fertilization. Eyed eggs (245-510 degree days for Atlantic salmon and 175-370 degree days for
rainbow trout) are very resistant to handling stress and can be shipped great distances.
Consequently, although Chilean-spawned eggs were available as early as 1980, Chilean hatcheries
remained largely dependent on fertilized eggs from Norwegian broodstock through the 1990S.
Since 2000, Chilean egg production has increased dramatically; as of September 2004, over 90%
of all eggs used in Chilean hatcheries were produced from local broodstock (Aqua al Dia 2004).
The increase in local egg production has resulted from improved understanding of the role of light
(photoperiod) and temperature (thermal) in the timing and rate of egg development and growth
rates in fry. This knowledge has permitted greater control over growth rates and allows smolts to
be produced in any month (Mundo Aculcola 2004). The Atlantic salmon eggs hatch after about
510 degree days (approximately 64 days at 8°C) as alevins or sac-fry. After 290 degree days
(approximately 36 days at 8°C), the sac-fry begin feeding and are referred to as fry or parr
(Edwards 1978). Rainbow trout eggs hatch after about 370 degree days (approximately 46 days at
8°C) months and begin feeding after 150 degree days (approximately 19 days at 8°C) after which
they are referred to as fry or fingerlings (Edwards 1978). Once Atlantic salmon parr reach 30-60
grams, they undergo physiological changes, smoltification, that prepares them for entering
seawater. Rainbow trout fingerlings can be transferred to saltwater at about sog.
The principle environmental concern with hatchery facilities is nutrient enrichment of effluent
water. While water re-circulation systems are increasingly common in developed nations, they are
not yet common in Chile. Indeed, effluents are often discharged without treatment in lake-based
tank and pen systems and in some stream-based systems. The Piscicultura Ri6 de la Plata facility
represents one of the newer hatcheries that are being held to effluent discharge quality standards.
The standards require that tailwaters not exceed the level of BOD (biological oxygen demand) of
the source water and that dissolved oxygen levels in the tailwaters match or exceed levels in the
source water. At the Piscicultura Ri6 de la Plata facility, these effluent standards are met with a
combination of physical screens, biofilitration, and paddlewheel aeration.
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Information that may be important for traceability and assurance regarding this stage of
production includes information about broodstock genetics, information about feed and
prophylactic regimens applied to broodstock, eggs, sac-fry, fry, parr, and fingerlings. Information
about the quality of water inflow and effluent discharges, the status of native aquatic fauna in
source and receiving waters may be needed to demonstrate environmental sustainability and
information about employee work-conditions, compensation and demographics may be needed to
demonstrate social responsibility.
Grow-out
In the second stage of production, smolts are transferred to marine cultivation centers for growout. The grow-out phase takes 8 to 18 months depending on species and water temperature.
Water temperatures vary by season, with cooler winter (June, July, and August) temperatures
slowing the rate of growth. The time required for grow-out is also dependent on feeding rates and
target slaughter size. The Chilean government regulates the size and placement of fish farm sites
and requires concession owners to report monthly stock and harvest volumes. Long-term leases
for farm sites are allocated on a first-come first-serve basis.
The cultivation phase accounts for 51.6% of the total cost of bringing salmon to the market, with
feed costs, alone, accounting for 60% and 70% of farm level costs (SalmonChile 2004). High feed
cost are due to dependence on high cost inputs (medications, vitamins, pigments, fishmeal and
other proteins, fish oil and fats, etc.). Recent cost savings have arisen from the substitution of
vegetable fats and proteins for higher-cost fish-based fats and proteins. Feed is delivered to each
pen using hopper-blower systems, similar to systems used in the installation of loose cellulose
insulation. Some farms use a portable hopper-blower system and carry the bags of feed to the
hopper. Other farms have a system of valved plastic pipes that distribute feed from a central
hopper/blower in the feed shed. In either case, feed delivery to individual pens is varied according
to the number and average size of fish, season, and water temperature. Feeding is monitored
using underwater cameras to ensure that feed is only delivered if the fish are actively feeding and
that feed delivery is continued until active feeding has ceased.
Farmed salmon are subject to viral, fungal, and bacterial diseases. Until recently, most of these
diseases were treated with antibiotics. However, some of the most effective antibiotics for fish
diseases are not approved for human consumption. Nevertheless, many of these antibiotics
continue to be used in Chile and elsewhere. In recent years, importing nations have become more
rigorous in testing for the presence of prohibited antibiotics and rejecting shipments found to
exceed established limits. Fish farmers have developed better understanding of the rate at which
traces of antibiotics are cleared from fish and labs have proliferated in salmon-producing regions
to test the level of antibiotics in samples before harvesting and shipment. While these measures
have reduced the number of shipments found to exceed established limits, there remain concerns
about the heavy use of antibiotics in finfish aquaculture in general and salmon/trout culture in
particular. These concerns have spurred interest in the development of vaccines. For example, in
2003, the majority of on-farm mortality resulted from rickettsia, a bacterial liver disease that
makes the fish lethargic and slows growth. A vaccine for rickettsia was developed in late 2003 and
became widely available in 2004. Fish are siphoned from the pen, defective fish are culled, and
the remaining fish are segregated by size, anesthetized, and vaccinated.
To reduce the incidence of disease and to ensure that penned fish receive sufficient oxygen, farm
managers must maintain good environmental conditions. Excessive feeding or stock rates that
exceed site capacity could lead to a concentration of organic wastes and localized eutrophication
that could reduce the concentration of dissolved oxygen and increase the density of undesirable
microorganisms. Even with careful feed management, net pens must be cleaned of algae and
fouling organisms about once every ten days to avoid reductions in water exchange that increase
the risk of oxygen deprivation.
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Another suite of issues arise in organic production. Without pharmaceuticals and feed
supplements, it is necessary to reduce stocking densities and increase monitoring and handling of
fish, thus the cost of organic production is higher than the cost of traditional production. The
premium consumers are willing to pay for organic salmon would have to be substantial to offset
the cost of higher mortality, more expensive feed, and increased labor (Sutherland 2001).
Although Chern et al. (2002) find that consumers in the United States, Norway, Japan, and
Taiwan are willing to pay premiums of up to 50% for non-GM salmon, their estimate should be
viewed with caution because it does not reflect differences in the relationship between marginal
willingness-to-pay and the volume of certified non-GM salmon made available to the market. It
should be noted that organic producers may pose adverse externalities for other producers by
increasing the reservoir of un-immunized fish that may increase the likelihood of disease
throughout a region.
In addition to carrying forward information from hatchery/nursery operations (broodstock
genetics, feed and prophylactic regimens applied to broodstock, eggs, sac-fry, fry, parr, and
fingerlings, etc.), traceability and assurance systems must document feed and prophylactic
regimens applied during the grow-out phase, demonstration that there in no mixing of fish
undergoing different regimens or mixing of feeds, medications, or colorants delivered fish being
grown under different regimens. Information about the quality of water inflow and effluent
discharges, the status of native aquatic fauna in source and receiving waters may be needed to
demonstrate environmental sustainability and information about employee work-conditions,
compensation and demographics may be needed to demonstrate social responsibility.
Processing and Distribution
When the salmon or trout reach market size-usually 1 kilo for pan size trout, 2 .8-3 kilo for whole
trout or coho salmon, and 4 to 5 kilos for salmon and trout to be cut into steaks or filleted-they
are readied for processing. Although growth rates can be influenced by feeding rates and feed
composition, and harvest size is a choice variable, in practice, the harvest window is dictated by
broodstock genetics and the date that smolts are stocked in the net-pens. While a continuous
product flow from hatchery to cultivation center and on to processing and distribution would be
ideal, the vagaries of supply and demand can upset this delicate balance, sometimes leaving
seawater pens empty or filled with aged and oversized fish. In Chile, the production of Atlantic
salmon and rainbow trout has been stabilized to yield near constant output throughout the year.
In contrast, production of coho and chinook salmon remains highly seasonal with peak output in
November through January, a season in which there is very little wild production to compete
against.
Chile's distance from North American, European, and Asian markets and the perishable character
of salmon and trout are disadvantageous. However, Chile's productive capacity and low
production costs offset this disadvantage and have allowed Chile to position itself as the foremost
producer of value-added salmon and trout products. In 2003, Chilean salmon and trout exports
exceeded one billion dollars, 67% of those exports were value-added products (Salmon Chile
2004). One of the limits to profitability and market development lies in the difficulty of pairing
airfreight imports with airfreight exports. Because most Chilean farmed salmon is transported to
market by air, there is relatively high payload for outbound freight. Chile has a relative advantage
in foreign markets that produce high volume exports for airfreight into Chilean markets. In
foreign markets that do not produce goods that are in high demand in Chile, the transportation
costs for salmon include the cost of deadhead return flights.
Several channels are used in the distribution of Chilean salmon: sales to wholesale distributors;
sales to institutional buyers, retailers and food service establishments; and direct sales to end
consumers. Each of these channels may require unique traceability and assurance information.
Barcodes and tracking numbers provide for rapid and transparent access to information for food
safety recalls or for accessing production information. The principle challenges for traceability
and assurance at the processing and distribution stages have to do with conservation of
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information from the hatchery and grow-out stages. There must be a verifiable flow of
information with the fish as it is processed for consumption and distributed to end markets. In
addition, there may be demand for information about the environmental impacts of processing
operations and waste discharges and about employee work-conditions, compensation and
demographics.
Feed Industry
Because feed is the largest component of farm level production costs for salmon and trout, many
producers coordinate with corporate owned yet separately managed feed companies, or are part
of a fully integrated feed manufacturing-fish farming operation. Variable supplies of key inputs,
fishmeal and fish oil also create incentive for further upstream coordination. Feed production is
highly concentrated, both vertically and horizontally. Consolidation in feed production has
resulted in a decline from 23 factories in 1992 to seven in 2003. Of those seven, two-Salmones
Antartica S.A. and Cultivos Marinos Chiloe Ltda-are wholly vertically integrated with
coordinated management (SalmonChile 2004). While Skretting Chile S.A., Ewos Chile S.A., and
Salmofood S.A share ownership interests with particular farm operators, they, along with Biomar
Chile and Alitec also produce and sell feed to independent farm operators.
The seven factories produce different sizes of pelletized feeds formulated to meet the dietary
requirements of trout and salmon fry, smolts, and maturing fish, medicated feeds, organic feeds,
feeds with and without colorants. Because nutrients and vitamins included in the feeds are not
stable for extended periods at ambient temperatures, most feed is produced near the fish farms
where it will be used and very little feed is shipped over long distances. The high cost of feed
results from dependence on high cost inputs (medications, vitamins, pigments, fishmeal and
other proteins, fish oil and fats, etc.).
Fishmeal prices are highly volatile and futures markets are not well established, so it is difficult
for feed producers to secure long-term contracts for fishmeal. The volatility of fishmeal prices is
largely due to fluctuations in fish meal supply that arise from natural variation in the abundance
of wild stocks of the fish species harvested as inputs into fishmeal. The primary sources of
fishmeal are the capture-fisheries for herrings, sardines, and anchovies. The largest of these
fisheries is the Peruvian-Ecuadorian-Chilean fishery for anchovetta (Engraulis ringens). While
this fishery is often the world's largest in capture fishery with landings in excess of 10 million
metric tons, population fluctuations driven by changes in nutrient availability associated with EI
Nino-Southern Oscillation can lead to order-of-magnitude swings in abundance and landings.
Thus, even though Chilean feed producers have an advantage of being close to a key source of
fishmeal, volatility in the availability and price of fishmeal has provided strong incentive to
develop feed formulations that are less dependent on fishmeal. However, diversifying towards
vegetable proteins would mean increased difficulty and complexity of providing traceability and
assurance. The more inputs used in feed production, the more breadth and depth of information
will be required. Extending traceability to include feed inputs (fish meal, fish oil, nutritional
supplements, medications, grains, or vegetable proteins) will increase the complexity and cost of
ensuring traceable product and quality assurance. Based on this, firms may choose to organize
production (e.g., integrate upstream into vegetable production) in different ways to achieve a
desired level of traceability and assurance.

Markets for Salmon
Chilean salmon and trout exports for 2004 have increased in volume and value when compared to
exports for the same period in 2003 (Table 3). In terms of value, the largest markets for Chilean
salmon are the U.S. and Japan. Other important markets include Germany, Brazil, France and
Thailand. Improved trade relations with developing markets have helped increase the share of
Chilean salmon sold in China, Israel, Russia, South Korea, Singapore and other nations.
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Table 3. Main markets, export quantity and value (2003 and 2004)

Quantity
(net tons)

Market

2003
117,142
119,075
15,340
16,840
17,449
285,846

United States
Japan
European Union
Latin America
Other
Total

Value
(millions $U.S. FOB)
2004
124,052
154,283
24,084
22,957
29,360
354,736

2003
543,690
427,066
60,574
55,926
60,172
1,147,428

Value
(%)
2004
40.5%
39.9%
8.3%
4.2%
7.1%
100%

2004
575,104
566,466
117,859
60,172
100,764
1,420,365

Source: Revista Aqua (2004, 2005)

Asche, Bj0rndal, and Young (2001) note that increases in production volume have depressed
prices in most markets. While technological has allowed production cost savings to keep pace
with declining product prices, Guttormsen (2002) reports that salmon farms, especially in
Norway, have reached a point where there is limited potential for additional substitution among
inputs. Because exchange rates fluctuate through time and because inputs are purchased in local
markets while products are sold in foreign markets, FOB prices in U.S. dollars do not accurately
reflect the actual value of revenues received by Chilean producers. It becomes evident that when
prices are expressed in Chilean pesos, Chilean producers have benefited from an average 3.4%
depreciation over the past 15 years 3 . To understand changes in the value of revenues over time, it
is important to adjust for inflation. Over the past 15 years, annual wholesale price inflation has
averaged 10.5% in Chile 4 • From 1990 through 2004, the average real price of Chilean Atlantic
salmon has declined by an average of 4% per year; the average real price of Chilean rainbow trout
has declined by an average of 4.8% per year; and, the average real price of Chilean coho salmon
has declined by average of 7.9% per year. 5 Average real FOB prices for Chilean salmon and trout
(pesos/kg) are represented in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Average real FOB prices for Chilean salmon and trout (pesos/kg), 2004 base year.

3

The 95% confidence interval for the estimated average rate of depreciation is 3.4% ±O .55% .

4

The 95% confidence interval for the estimated average rate of wholesale price inflation is 1O.5% ±2.1% .

5

The 95% confidence interval for the estimated decline in the average real price is 4.0%±1 .6% for Chilean Atlantic salmon,

4.8% ±4.5% for Chilean rainbow trout, and 7.9%±4.4% for Chilean coho salmon.
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The interplay between markets for farmed and wild salmon has been thoroughly explored, by
Anderson (1985a, 1985b), Bird (1986), Herrmann and Lin (1988), Lin, Herrmann, and
Mittelhammer (1989), Lin et al. (1989), Herrmann, Lin, and Mittelhammer (1991), Herrmann,
Mittelhammer, and Lin (1992, 1993a,b), DeVoretz and Salvanes (1993), Herrmann (1993),
Herrmann and Greenberg (1994), Wessells and Wilen (1993a, 1993b), Wessells and Holland
(1998), Asche, Bj0rndal, and Salvanes (1998), Asche, Bremnes, and Wessells (1999), Clayton and
Gordon (1999), and Jaffry et al. 2000. The basic finding is that farmed Atlantic and coho salmon
are close substitutes in fresh and frozen markets in the United States, E.U., and Japan. As world
prices for salmon have declined with the expansion of farmed production, the capture fisheries
have been thrown into financial disarray that has led to bankruptcy and cessation of fishing by
those least able to restructure to reduce their harvesting costs.

Production Costs
Salmon producers have generally separated their activities into fresh water or smolt production,
sea farming operations, processing, and sales. The most recent estimates of the cost share of each
of these production stages are reported in table 4.
Table 4. Cost Components for Chilean Salmon Production (2003)
% of Total Cost
Hatche~/Nurse~ O~erations

% of Cost by Stage

3.0%

Farming Operations
Feed
Pigments
Manual labor
External services
Other costs
Other costs of grow-out

30.0%
6.0%
6.0%
4.8%
4.6%
0.2%

58.1%
11.6%
11.6%
9.3%
8.9%
0.4%

Subtotal of Farming O~erations

51.6%

100.0%

Processing Plant
Manual labor
Packaging materials
Energy
Maintenance and other costs

12.0%
4.0%
0.9%
2.0%

63.5%
21.2%
4.8%
10.6%

Subtotal of Processing Cost

18.9%

100.0%

Transport and Sales
Ground freight
International airfreight
International ocean freight
Cool and frozen storage
Sales costs

1.5%
13.0%
3.0%
0.5%
0.5%

8.1%
70.3%
16.2%
2.7%
2.7%

Subtotal of Trans~ort and Sales Costs

18.5%

100.0%

8.0%

Administrative and Financing Costs

100.0%

Total Production Cost

Source: S. Martinez and R. Infante cited in SalmonChile (2004).

Activities generating the most significant costs for farming operations are feed and feed pigments
(69.7%) and labor to administer feed (11.6%). The most costly activities for processing operations
are labor (63.5%) and packaging (21.2%). Processing labor costs are high primarily because pin
bones are too fine for machine removal. It is surprising that marketing (sales costs) are such a
small share (0.5%) of total production and distribution costs. In contrast, the U.S. broiler industry
(e.g., Tyson Foods, Pilgrims Pride, Perdue, Foster, Gold Kist, etc.), which like integrated salmon
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aquaculture operations in Chile, controls the entire value-chain from feed input through endconsumer brands, spends substantially more. 6
Increased consolidation among vertically integrated salmon producers could increase the
resources available for as well as potential benefits of investment in own-brand development and
marketing to end-consumers. Implementation of traceability and assurance systems capable of
documenting assertions about measurable characteristics of end products and credence attributes
regarding production inputs and processes will create the opportunity for marketing to
consumers who are willing to pay a premium for particular quality characteristics and credence
attributes. One advantage for larger producers with multiple farms is that natural variations in
their output caused by lags in the production process can be smoothed by staggering production
across multiple farms. For large producers, fluctuations in output can be a small percentage of
their total output and it is relatively easy to maintain brand awareness. For small producers, the
production cycle results in intervals when product is available and intervals when it is not;
maintaining brand awareness becomes difficult in such an environment (Tveteras and Asche
2004). As a whole, the industry should benefit from increased emphasis on understanding the
end-consumer and establishing an international presence through foreign sales offices
(Hernandez 2004). However, part of the problem with advertising expenditures for salmon is that
advertising benefits all producers whether they do or do not help pay the cost (Kinnucan and
Myrland 2001, 2002, 2003; Myrland and Kinnucan 2001; Myrland et al. 2004)
INDUSTRIAL EVOLlITrON AND INDUSTRY STRUCTURE

The structure and organization of industries changes over time in response to changes in input
and output markets and changes in technology. Firms can thrive or founder as circumstances
change, either because they had the good fortune to be pre-adapted to the new circumstances or
because they have chosen to position themselves strategically in anticipation of the new
circumstances. That is, firms and industries may evolve through time under the influence of
"Darwinian" natural selection-survival of the fittest, or "Lamarkian" transferal of acquired
characteristics. When consumer preferences change, when new physical or organizational
technologies emerge, when the cost of inputs change, firms and industries will thrive or fail
because of the suitability of pre-existent inherent characteristics or because of their adaptive
capabilities. In other words, a firm or industry may evolve consciously or randomly.
The rise of consumer and political demand for traceability and assurance with respect to food
safety, product quality, and credence attributes represents a new competitive pressure on firms
and industries. Some firms and organizational structures, by happenstance or foresight, are preadapted to satisfy the demand for traceability and assurance. Firms that are not pre-adapted must
either acquire infrastructure and organization to support traceability and assurance or surrender
real and potential market share in markets that demand traceability and assurance. Out of
rational self-interest, firm owners can be expected to maximize some objective: maximizing
profits, manager-utility, market share, growth rate, shareholder value, etc. Other goals of the firm
may include minimizing transaction costs (Coase 1937), or the cost of principal-agent incentives
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Firms or organizations that are successful further the collective
interest of their members-benefiting from the synergies created.

Recent Evolution in the Meat Industries
In recent years, many segments of the food and agribusiness industry have become more
concentrated through horizontal or vertical integration within firms or through the formation of
cooperatives or other associations. The vertical and horizontal consolidation taking place in the
salmon aquaculture industry resembles changes that have already taken place in the poultry and

6 In August 2004, Tyson Foods launched a $75 million campaign for poultry, beef, and pork (Tyson Foods 2004).

Although the largest private label poultry producer, Gold Kist, does little consumer advertising, their total marketing
budget is over $2 million (Moore 2005).
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pork industries, and to a lesser degree in beef. Tvetedls and Kva10Y (2004) assert that potential
incentives for increased consolidation in the salmon aquaculture industry are in part due to food
safety, food quality, and environmental effects. Consequently, an examination of the evolution of
poultry, pork, and beef industries and their experience in adapting to heightened concerns about
food safety, and demands for traceability and assurance may provide insight into the types of
organizational structures that are likely to be successful for the salmon aquaculture industry.
The u.s. pork industry has recently undergone a transformation in its structural organization
from 11% of production under contract or vertical integration in 1993 to 64% in 1999 (Preckel et
al. 2004). Preckel et al. (2004) suggest that a primary reason for the emergence of vertical
integration in the pork industry is that vertical integration provides improved communication to
suppliers about animal characteristics valued by the market. The demand for traceability and
assurance can be motivated as a demand for information about latent product attributes;
information that some, but not necessarily all, consumers want. Implementing traceability
systems may provide a mechanism for improved signaling of these product attributes. Reimer
(2004) suggests that with increased demand for traceability and assurance, packers are more
likely to integrate upstream if producers exhibit low investment productivity. Producers with low
investment productivity are less able to access capital needed to invest in new technologies or
traceability software and assurance systems. In addition, given their proximity to and need to
communicate with consumers and retailers, packers are on the front line with respect to liability
for food safety, environmental, and animal welfare concerns. Exercising direct control of
upstream production is one of managing risk associated with liability for food safety,
environmental, and animal welfare concerns. In addition, if packers consolidate horizontally,
producers will lose market power and have even less ability to access capital needed to invest in
traceability software and assurance systems.
The recent evolution of the pork industry suggests some possible changes in the Chilean salmon
industry. For example, it can be expected that independent salmon farmers are at a relative
disadvantage in negotiations with processors because processors are relatively few in number and
control some production capacity through ownership or contract. Similarly, it can be expected
that independent salmon farmers are at a relative disadvantage in negotiations with feedsuppliers because feed-suppliers are relatively few in number and control some production
capacity through ownership or contract. Moreover, because many of the processors and feedsuppliers are controlled by the same parent firms, and because those parent firms also control
production facilities, it can be expected that independent farmers have relatively little power. The
perishable nature of feed inputs and farm output also shift market power to feed-suppliers who
have many customers and away from independent farmers who cannot stockpile feeds, and to
processors who can rely on their own farms and many other independent farmers for processready fish and away from farmers who have a perishable product and a limited ability to transport
their product to any but the closest processors.
Producers would be likely to integrate upstream when hatcheries show low investment
productivity and if liability is high. In the case of producers, it is expected that horizontal
integration will be used as a risk management strategy because it is unlikely that multiple
geographically distributed production facilities would suffer simultaneous "crop" failures. Indeed,
the strategy of horizontal consolidation and geographical diversification is evidenced by recent
mergers and acquisitions. Under Nutreco's ownership, Marine Harvest and Stolt Sea Farms
produce upwards of 20% of global farmed salmon with facilities in Norway, Chile, Canada, the
Faroe Islands and other locations. As supply relationships increasingly bypass the middleman, it
becomes evermore costly to fail to deliver product at an expected time; processors can increase
the likelihood of satisfying contractual obligations to wholesalers and retailers by taking steps to
ensure that supply from producers is not interrupted. Although processors could ensure the
scheduling of deliveries through ownership or contract, the advantage of ownership is that it
reduces the possibility that a producer might renege on the contract.
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Like the pork industry, most poultry slaughter firms (e.g., Tyson Foods or Perdue) have
integrated ownership throughout the chain and detailed contracts with growers. Ollinger,
MacDonald, and Madison (2005) analyzed structural change in poultry industries and found that
from 1967-1992 the mean plant size increased six fold for turkey processors and nearly tripled for
chicken processors. However, they suggest that the presence of negative cost externalities places
limits on further expansion of processing scale economies. As processing capacity has increased,
processors have faced increased transportation costs because of limitations placed on the scale
and density of poultry production facilities due to concerns about manure disposal and animal
and human health. Food safety is also an issue, if authorities purposefully limit plant size for
accurate inspections, or in one case, insufficient water supply for washing carcass restrained plant
size (Ollinger, McDonald,and Madison 2005).
These types of constraints also apply to processors and producers of Chilean salmon. For
instance, environmental regulations limit the size and concentration of farm sites. It is important
to locate processing facilities near concentrated producer areas to exploit economies of scale and
scope. Processors can increase the number of products, increase further processing, expand
product mix to include other fish or seafood, and expand the number of international markets
into which they sell. With greater consolidation, the ability to control food safety would likely
increase, but increasing plant size and product mix might increase the cost of traceability and
assurance due to differing product requirements and the number distant/ distinct suppliers.
In a recent review of the effects the United State's National Animal Identification (NAIS) will have
on the cattle market structure, Mark (2004) suggests that competitive effects will depend on a
firm's size and position in the marketing chain; smaller cow-calf producers, stockers, and feed
yards will likely be exposed to the greatest structural changes as economies of size, price
discounts/premiums relayed from downstream feed yards and packers, liability protection, and
possible gains with increased management information influence adaptive capability.
Productivity or marketing gains could come from improved genetic tracking where consumers
demand characteristics verifiable through genetics.
In the case of salmon, if traits such as "not genetically modified" (non-GM) are valued by retailers,
or consumers, traceability and assurance systems which trace and verify breeding and genetics
could be important for maintaining market share. With increased costs of transferring this
additional information, it is advantageous to reduce the number of transactions between input
sources, producers, processors, and customers. Producers and processors who can minimize the
number of intermediate transactions will have lower costs for animal identification and traceback.
The NAIS system has received considerable debate over whether it should be voluntary or
mandatory. Imposing a traceability system through political processes rather than allowing it to
emerge in response to consumer demand expressed through the market, imposes costs on those
who do not value traceability and subsidizes those who do. While debate over whether
implementation of traceability and assurance programs could or should be left to the market or
mandated by government may be interesting, it is, in large measure, moot; requirements for
traceability and assurance are being implemented by governments in Chile's principal export
markets. Tothova and Oehmke (2004) note that cross-country differences in consumer
preferences and regulatory approaches have polarized markets into clubs (e.g., those such as the
United States, that accept GM foods and those such as the E.U. that do not). The polarization of
markets increases the challenges that firms and industries face. Should they specialize in serving
the consumer preferences and regulations of a single trade partner or generalize to meet the
divergent consumer preferences and regulations of multiple partners? In order to participate in
multiple markets, producers may need to implement parallel production and traceability
systems-to be used for example in simultaneously servicing separate GM and GM-free markets.

Cooperation vs. Competition
The Chilean salmon industry exhibits diverse patterns of governance and ownership. Ownership
within the Chilean salmon industry includes large multinational firms, a large number of
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medium- to large-sized domestic firms, and a few smaller firms. The initial success of the Chilean
salmon industry came from small producers emerging in response to international demand. As
the scale of production increased, firms increased their size and began to integrate. Under the
umbrella of SalmonChile, these fragmented producers began to share information, input sources,
and output markets, consciously evolving into an industrial cluster. The current pattern of interbusiness relations is quasi-hierarchic, with cooperative efforts in research and development,
foodstuffs, vaccines, etc., and hierarchic relations between large firms and the small and medium
sized suppliers. As vertical and horizontal consolidation takes place, the benefits of cooperation
may decline.
Bontems and Fulton (2004) note that "privately held information is valuable to those that posses
it, while it imposes a cost on those that do not." This, they suggest, can provide cooperatives with
an organizational cost advantage over for-profit firms when privately held information is
important to the success of the organization. If a Chilean cooperative held private informationrelated to traceability and assurance-that was important to the objectives of its members, it
could have an organizational and cost advantage over the independent firms operating outside
that cooperative. For instance, a cooperative in the Chilean salmon industry could share the cost
of knowledge intensive software requisite to ensuring traceable product. One positive externality
might be the development of consumer trust towards the firm or cooperative able to meet
requirements of either regulation or consumer preferences for credence attributes.
Weaver and Chin (2004) suggest that collective bargaining can increase producer profits when
they face individual processors that might exercise monopsony power. Collective bargaining
through producer cooperatives enables farmers to capture margins that otherwise would go to
processors and can maximize total surplus. If market power is held by one intermediate stage, e.g.
processing, coordination through supply contracts may be better than coordination through open
markets (Asirvatham and Bhuyan 2004). Tveteras (2004) suggests that long-term contracts could
be a viable alternative to vertical integration for salmon farmers and processors. Similarly, it may
be advantageous for independent farm operators to organize as an input-buying cooperative to
offset the market power associated with the high degree of concentration in feed production. To
date, feed manufacturers have exercised considerable power over smaller salmon producers, who
often enter loan contracts to be repaid after harvest, and by so doing, give feed suppliers partial
influence over production and marketing. Because implementation of a traceability system
requires transmission of information from each stage of production to the next, and because the
development and transmission of information is costly, it can be anticipated that the burden of
the cost of traceability systems will be distributed between stages of production according to their
relative market power.
With respect to food safety, or product recalls, the collective industry image is at stake; therefore,
a cooperative effort would be expected largely focused on painting a picture of transparency and
quality assurance to buyers and consumers. This effort is evident with SalmonChile's new
Integrated Management System (SIGES) created in response to emerging international
requirements for safety, security, social responsibility, and sustainable production. Fourteen
companies, including several of the largest multinationals, have enrolled so far. In order to obtain
the SalmonChile-SIGES certification, companies must commit to adhere to otherwise voluntary
protocols (e.g., information system software, ISO, OSHA, HACCP, best practice guidelines, etc.).
A software package from Chiles oft S.A. is available for tracking records and product, but is not
required for SIGES certification; companies can employ other electronic record systems.
Although feed inputs have not yet been included in SIGES, efforts are underway to expand SIGES
to include feed inputs. One problem, which has been identified in other production processes (e.g.
pork, beef, etc.), is maintaining traceability to the farm level (Bailey, Jones, and Dickinson 2002).
It appears that the depth of traceability required by SIGES addresses this problem.
These collective efforts are not limited to one industry; a workshop organized by SOTA brought
representatives from the Chilean and Canadian salmon industries and from the U.S. Food
Marketing Institute (FMI) to discuss harmonization of standards. The plan is to integrate the
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Chilean (SIGES) and Canadian systems with the Safe Quality Food (SQF) program from FMI.
Interestingly, this system would not include Norwegian, U.K., and Faroe Island producers. This
materializes into using the attributes certified by SQF (including quality, environment, safety, and
sustainability) to benefit SOTA member producers. By using common standards and certification
schemes, SOTA members (Chile, United States, and Canada) should be able to benefit by
promoting a clean, dependable, and sustainable industry while also intensifying advertising for
additional certified attributes.
If some firms wish to convey additional information about quality or credence attributes beyond
the basic information conveyed through SIGES it may be advantageous to develop a stand-alone
alternative rather than support SIGES and a parallel system for these other attributes. For
example, a retailer in the United States selling organic salmon from Chile could not rely on SIGES
to verify that inputs and processes complied with organic production standards. Since
SalmonChile does not certify organic, a separate or combination traceability chain would need to
be used to ensure that certified organic product is not mingled with uncertified product between
being shipped from the producer and arriving at the retailer. Thus, a producer seeking to
differentiate a product based on credence attributes would likely incur costs greater than costs
incurred by participants in SIGES. If several producers desired to market the same attribute, they
might be able to cooperatively arrange and share the cost of certification, inspections, etc. Unless
premiums are sufficiently high, producers might be discouraged from creating differentiated
products and investing in separate traceability systems. The size and type of firm could also
influence this decision. Where vertically integrated firms are responsible for several stages of
recordkeeping and information transfer, single stage firms are less so and could have lower
transaction costs. Furthermore, the largest integrated and single stage firms should have larger
capital resources for investment and specialization of traceability and assurance systems from
which information management can exploit gains to productivity and marketing.
TRACEABILITY AND ASSURANCE

While traceability in the E.U. and United States is driven by consumer demand and food safety
concerns, traceability in Chile is driven by a desire to maintain access to the E.U. and North
American markets. While the idea of traceability is rather simple, execution and implementation
is complex. The seafood industry-including the salmon aquaculture industry-has not yet
achieved the level of traceability and assurance that is characteristic of beef, poultry, pork, and
other protein industries. However, with recent advancements in the seafood and salmon
industries, the disparity is shrinking. Improvements in traceability are originating from stricter
governmental oversight, industry association involvement with supply and production-chain
traceability systems, and individual producer investments in software for tracking and database
integration.

Definitions
There are many definitions and terms used to describe traceability: trace, traceback or tracing,
traceforward or tracking, product tracing, or simply recordkeeping. Although we use traceability
as a catchall term, it is important to acknowledge that specific terms and specific definitions have
specific meaning in law and regulation. ISO 9000:2000 (ISO 2004) guidelines define traceability
as: the ability to trace the history, application or location of that which is under consideration.
E.U. (2002, 2004) define traceability within the food chain as: the ability to trace and follow a
food, feed, food-producing animal or substance intended to be or expected to be incorporated into
a food or feed, through all stages of production, processing and distribution. Codex (2004)
defines traceability as: the ability to follow the movement of a food through specified stage(s) of
production, processing and distribution. Farm Foundation (2004) defines traceability as: the
efficient and rapid tracking of physical product and traits from and to critical points of origin or
destination in the food chain necessary to achieve specific food safety and, or, assurance goals.
SalmonChile specifies traceability or tracking systems as a: method of exact and opportune
identification of products, in any part of the supply chain, by means of a bar code with an
incorporated database of information leading to its origin. It may also be helpful to define
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traceability by what it does not do-it does not assure food quality or safety, rather it provides
useful information for decision-making. As it implies, traceability tracks the product, its inputs,
attributes or other processes. Traceability is an information system, which provides information
about the extent to which quality assurance systems such as HACCP, ISO, SQF, etc., are
functioning.
Differences in traceability systems may lead to inefficiencies and confusion (Dickinson and Bailey
2005). Resolving these differences has been one of the aims of several international (e.g., CIES7,

EAN. UCC, Codex, OlE), national (e.g., British Retail Consortium, Farm Foundation), and
aquaculture specific organizations (e.g., TracefishjSeaFoodPlus 8 , Global Aquaculture Alliance 9 ).
These, along with other government, associations, and private sector organizations have
endeavored to accurately define traceability and make the sharing of traceability information
more flexible and useful. The objectives of traceability systems differ; therefore, each should be
defined by those characteristics that drive the system. Golan et al. (2004) and Souza-Monteiro
and Caswell (2004) classify traceability systems according to: breadth-the amount of
information recorded; depth-how far backwards or forwards the system tracks information; and,
precision-the degree of assurance to which the system can pinpoint or isolate a product's
movement or characteristics. The breath, depth, and precision of a traceability system will depend
on the product and the incentives for adopting a traceability system.

What is Driving Traceability?
Interest in implementing traceability in the food chain was initially set in motion by high profile
food safety scares-bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), foot and mouth disease, and dioxin
and PCB contaminants. For example, in January 1999, dioxins and PCBs contaminated animal
feed in Belgium, affecting an array of agricultural products, disrupting trade, and costing the
country millions of euros. Without proper records to identify and trace contaminated feed,
blanket recalls were issued, imposing a cost on products which in hindsight may have been
perfectly safe (Buzby 2003). In 2001, an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in the United
Kingdom cost the U.K. cattle industry about $13 billion. Similarly, the 2003 discovery of BSE in a
small number of Canadian cattle cost the Canadian industry billions of dollars and led the
Canadian government to outlay over $400 million in aid to affected ranchers. The discovery of a
BSE infected dairy cow in eastern Washington, in 2003, effectively halted U.S. beef exports to
Asian and other markets, costing U.S. producers over $180 per head in reduced sales value; a loss
of over $6 billion for the U.S. cattle industry as a whole (FoodOrigins 2004).
FAa (2004) suggests that traceability systems could be useful as an effective protocol for
administering food safety, quality assurance, and biosecurity, while also enhancing management
of production, distribution, and marketing. The motives and objectives for traceability and
assurance systems are diverse and specifically tailored to meet the needs of consumers and food
chain participants from retail to production. Golan et al. (2004) suggest that firms will benefit
from implementing and maintaining traceability systems when used as a tool for supply
management. Firms may also use traceability systems to limit liability in case of recall and to
complement HACCP, good management practices (GMP), and other assurance systems for
ensuring food safety and quality assurance. Additional benefits may arise from using traceability
systems as a means of verifying authenticity of differentiated products with credence attributes 1o .
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CIES-The Food Business Forum includes over two thirds of the world's largest retailers and suppliers.
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TraceFish is a European Commission initiative to establish a common position for recording traceability information in
the farmed and captured fish supply chains (EAN 2002). SeaFoodPlus is an implementation of Tracefish.
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Global Aquaculture Alliance (GAA) is a nongovernmental organization that has established best aquaculture practices
and standards. GAA runs a nonprofit certifying body (Aquaculture Certification Council) that verifies adherence to
mandatory requirements for food safety and traceability.
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Credence attributes may be either content or process attributes. Content attributes are related to the physical
properties of a product and in some cases may be hard for consumers to detect. For example, the level of healthy
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In addition, using traceability as a business management tool to maintain contractual quality,
develop commercial partnerships, optimize production, distribution, and marketing, and to
facilitate horizontal and vertical integration (FAO 2004). Beyond the firm, governments also have
incentive to use traceability as a security device for protecting the food supply from terrorist
actions (e.g., contamination of food or feedstuffs with pathogens or toxins).
The standards and requirement for traceability are in large part driven by domestic and foreign
government regulation and the downstream power of large retailers. The most relevant and
significant legislation on traceability has come from the E.U., United States, and Japan. The E.U.
has passed comprehensive regulations covering several foods including beef, fish, and GM
products (E.U. 2002, 2004). Effective January 1, 2005, the E.U. began requiring mandatory
traceability for the entire food chain; under E.U. regulations, this means that firms must be able
to track all suppliers and buyers of food or feed and store the information for inspection. The E.U.
regulations also require country of origin identification. In the U.S., the National Animal
Identification System (NAIS) and the Public Health Security Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002 are in the initial stages of implementation with final requirements still in
development. The goal of these regulations is to protect food supply from tampering and fully
trace food products to their source of origin in the event of a safety related incident. The USDA's
National Organic Standards Board (NOSB) will also present standards for handling and labeling
organic seafood products in the fall of 2005 (The Wave 2005b). Japan's Ministry of Agriculture,
Forestry, and Fisheries has implemented mandatory traceability requirements for beef and is
updating requirements for other products in the food chain.
While governments have taken a prominent role in mandating traceability, firms have also taken
a key role. For example, in 2004, Wal-Mart and Sam's Club in cooperation with several
manufacturers (The Gillette Company, HP, Johnson & Johnson, Kimberly-Clark, Kraft Foods,
Nestle-Purina PetCare Company, Procter & Gamble, and Unilever) started tracking cases and
pallets using electronic product codes (EPC) and radio frequency identification (RFID)
technology. Wal-Mart's top 100 suppliers were expected to have RFID tags by January 2005.
Similarly, McDonald's had a goal of tracking 10% of its beef before the end of 2004 (Gjerde et al.
2004). Wal-Mart and McDonald's are asking suppliers to go beyond government regulation and
use traceability systems to add value and reduce liability.
In evaluating the desirability of implementing traceability and assurance systems, it is important
to consider the trade-offs between mandatory and voluntary systems and between public and
private implementation. Because traceability and assurance have characteristics of public and
private goods, it is difficult to decide who should administer, enforce, or certify such systemsgovernments or firms. Goldsmith (2004) indicates that for public food safety problems, such as
disease outbreaks or bioterrorism, it may be more effective to incentivize public-private
partnerships rather than wholly devolve responsibility to private firms. However, in open
markets, private industry innovation and investment will usually precede government
involvement. For proprietary or private goods, such as, differentiated credence attributes or
management information firms have opportunity to secure competitive advantages with market
position and/or product price, and thus have private incentive to develop traceability and
assurance systems (Farm Foundation 2004). Even so, in certifying traceability and assurance
systems or resultant product attributes, information asymmetries or dishonesty could diminish
consumer trust in government, third party, or producer certifications (Christensen et al. 2003;
Ward, Hunnicutt, and Keith 2004). Certification preferences for safety, quality, organic,
sustainability and social responsibility attributes, etc., vary across products, industries, and
nations. In lieu of these tradeoffs, it is evident that "one size does not fit all"; flexibility and
customization should be considered depending on the traceability capabilities and goals of
specific industries (Farm Foundation 2004).

omega-3 fatty acids in salmon cannot be discerned by tasting it. Process attributes refer to the characteristics of the
production process. These include country-of-origin, free-range, shade-grown, dolphin-safe, fair trade, earthfriendly, and organic (Golan et al. 2004).
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One consequence of mandatory or voluntary traceability is the potential for increased
accountability and liability. Indeed, increased liability is a primary concern of many who oppose
the implementation of mandatory traceability programs. With movement towards full chain
traceability in the E.U. and stricter tracing of products in the U.S., increased depth of traceability
will place greater liability on producers (Liddell and Bailey 2001). With this pressure, producers
face a dilemma of whether to falsify information or improve production and processing methods.
Given the choice, producers may reduce risk and preserve reputation and consumer trust by
responsibly providing transparent information (Souza-Monteiro and Caswell 2004).
It can be anticipated that the costs and benefits of traceability and assurance will vary according
to size and market or chain position of businesses, and on consumer's willingness-to-pay (WTP)
or demand for particular product attributes. Two examples cited by Gjerde et al. (2004) indicate a
general willingness to pay for quality attributes and origin. In the first example, Gjerde et al.
(2004) report that research by two U.S. retailers, suggested that consumers are willing to pay 1215% more for source-verified products with identifiable positive attributes. In the second
example, Gjerde et al. (2004) report that a recent E.U. survey suggests that 52% of European
consumers would be willing to pay more for their meats and vegetables if they were provided with
information about the country of origin and assured of a 5-10% increase in product quality.
Results from willingness-to-pay experiments conducted for red meats (beef and pork) in the
United States, Canada, United Kingdom, and Japan indicate that nontrivial premiums exist for
traceability with even higher WTP for specific attributes such as safety and animal treatment
(Dickinson and Bailey 2005). However, a significant portion of consumers in these countries also
indicated that they would not pay for traceability attributes. A broader observation highlighted by
Dickinson and Bailey (2005) is that irrespective of product, results indicate that consumers are
willing to pay for environmental and food safety related attributes. Indeed, there is a growing
interest, among some consumers, for goods associated with attributes related to the choice of
inputs, source of inputs, origin, or production processes employed in manufacturing the goodattributes such as "organic," "fair labor," "GMO-free," "sustainable," "Made in the U.K," etc.
Huffman et al. (2003) estimate consumers are willing to pay a 14% premium for food perceived as
non-GM.

In the case of salmon, Chern et al. (2002) find that consumers in the United States, Norway,
Japan, and Taiwan are willing to pay premiums of up to 50% for non-GM salmon. Nevertheless,
their estimate should be viewed with caution because it does not reflect differences in the
relationship between marginal willingness-to-pay and the volume of certified non-GM salmon
made available to the market. Kaneko and Chern (2003) also found that some U.S. consumers
were willing to pay 40.9% and 52.5% above base price to avoid farmed GM-fed salmon and GM
salmon.n In a survey of U.S. consumers, Wessells and Holland (1998) and Holland and Wessells
(1998) suggest that for retail purchases of salmon, consumers prefer farmed to wild, and federally
inspected as the means of seafood safety inspection.
The issue of GM-fed and GM salmon draws into focus the concern over sustainability. Some
NGOs have decried the use of fish meal derived from capture fisheries and the use of GM -soy in
fish feeds. One response has been to promote sustainable fisheries with ecolabels (e.g., MSC).
Gudmundsson and Wessells (2000) use bioeconomic modeling to discuss the effectiveness of
ecolabels on sustainable fisheries management. They report that ecolabels could increase
sustainable fisheries management if there is a price premium for ecolabels and if the label is
trusted and unique from other labels. An ecolabeling survey conducted by Wessells, Johnston,
and Donath (1999) found that consumers with larger weekly seafood budgets where more likely to
choose certified seafood. However, a difference is reported between those with larger budgets and
those purchasing a particular species more often. Those purchasing salmon at least once a month,
were less likely to choose certified salmon compared to those purchasing salmon less frequently,
and those involved with environmental groups were more likely to choose ecolabels. Wessells
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Salmon fed with genetically modified inputs (e.g., GM soybeans) would be characterized as GM-fed salmon. Gene
modification of the fish itself would be characterized as GM salmon.
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